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Abstract
The last three decades have witnessed the rise of a political gender
gap in the United States wherein more women than men favor the Demo-
cratic party. We trace this development to the decline in marriage, which
we posit has made men richer and women poorer. Data for the United
States support this argument. First, there is a strong positive correlation
between state divorce prevalence and the political gender gap – higher di-
vorce prevalence reduces support for the Democrats among men but not
women. Second, longitudinal data show that following marriage (divorce),
women are less (more) likely to support the Democratic party.
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1 Introduction
Had only women voted in the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, the Democratic
candidate Al Gore would have won a landslide victory: 54 percent of female vot-
ers cast their vote for him. However, 53 percent of men voted for Bush [Voter
News Service exit poll, reported in New York Times November 12, 2000]. This
striking difference in political preferences between men and women is a signifi-
cant feature of the present political landscape [Becker February 1997; Inglehart
and Norris 2000; Norris forthcoming]. It is, however, a recent development.
Until the mid-1960s, women were consistently more conservative than men
[Duverger 1955; Harvey 1998]. In the 1980s a significant number of men, so
called “Reagan Democrats”, switched party allegiance to the Republicans, lead-
ing to a political hegemony of the right. The 1990s saw previously conservative
voting women, so called “Soccer Moms”, moving to the left, resulting in the
Clinton years [Stark 1996]. The consequence is that over the past 20 years the
gap between men’s and women’s political preferences has reversed its direction,
and it has become significant to the extent that in the last two elections men
and women would have chosen different presidents.
Figure I illustrates the evolution of this political gender gap in the United
States between 1952 and 1996. The period saw the gap between the proportion
of women and men who identify themselves as Democrats increase from -2 to
12 percent. A near identical trend is evident in Europe (Figure II).
The United States also witnessed a fall of over a quarter in the proportion
of currently married adults, and a three-fold rise in the proportion of currently
divorced individuals in the last three decades.1 We argue that men transfer
resources to women in marriage. We further argue that this decline in marriage
made women poorer relative to men and thereby contributed to the political
gender gap. Underlying the latter argument is the assumption that individual
political party affiliation is determined by (per capita) income through its effect
on preferences with respect to redistribution. This hypothesis provides the
following testable predictions.
First, it implies that a decline in marriage has affected political preferences
principally amongst middle income voters. Whilst a poor man is richer if unmar-
ried, he is still sufficiently poor to favor redistribution; similarly, rich women,
while poorer if unmarried, remain rich enough to oppose redistribution. How-
ever, among the middle income group, marital status impacts income suffi-
ciently to affect political preferences. Second, the political impact of increased
non-marriage will depend on its incidence across middle income groups.2 For
instance, if a relatively poor, i.e. left-leaning, couple divorces, support for the
left will fall if the man becomes rich enough to favor the right. Conversely, if
a relatively rich, i.e. right-leaning, couple divorces, support for the left will rise
1Between 1964 and 1996 the proportion of adults aged 18-64 currently married fell from
84 to 58 percent, and those divorced rose from 3 to 10 percent (Current Population Survey,
authors’ calculations).
2We use the term non-marriage to emphasize that this category covers all individuals,
including cohabitants, who are currently not married.
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if the woman’s income falls sufficiently. Third, if non-marriage first affects the
poor and thereafter extends upward in the income distribution, then we would
expect men to shift right before women shift left.
Our empirical analysis focuses on testing the first prediction and we find
robust evidence. We note, however, that the two other predictions are consistent
with stylized facts [Stark 1996].
First, we analyze survey data from the biennial National Election Studies
(1964-96) to examine whether changes in aggregate divorce risk affected male
and female political preferences differently. We use two proxies for divorce
risk: the extent of state-level divorce computed from the Current Population
Survey, and the passage of unilateral divorce laws. We find a strong positive
correlation between increased divorce risk and the political gender gap. We
only find this correlation amongst middle income respondents, irrespective of
whether we measure political preferences by an individual’s party affiliation or
redistributive preferences.
Second, we directly examine how changes in marital status affect an indi-
vidual’s party affiliation. To this end, we analyze three waves of the Youth
Parent Socialization Survey, a longitudinal study that interviewed a nationally
representative sample of 1965 high school graduates in 1965, 1973 and 1982. We
find that marriage and divorce affect a woman’s party affiliation significantly
more than they do a man’s. Marriage tends to make a woman more Republican,
whereas divorce tends to make her more Democratic. We find no evidence of a
shift in political preferences presaging divorce for either sex. That is, changes
in political affiliation between 1965 and 1973 do not predict changes in marital
status between 1973 and 1982.
A number of alternative explanations for the evolution of the gender gap
have been proposed. Our analysis investigates their relevance.
It has been suggested that the rise in female labor force participation makes
women more likely to favor the left by increasing their awareness of labor market
discrimination and/or raising demand for state subsidized child care. We find,
however, that the correlation between divorce risk and the gender gap is robust
to the inclusion of controls for both individual and aggregate labor force partic-
ipation. We also find that working makes middle income women, but not poor
or rich women, more likely to favor the Democrats. An interpretation consistent
with our hypotheses is that, for this group, women’s decisions to work have been
predicated on a fall in income from deteriorating marriage market conditions
[Johnson and Skinner 1986]. We also show that increases in aggregate female
labor force participation had no impact on political preferences other than for
the richest 5 percent of households, where men became more Democratic.
An alternative explanation invokes the recent adoption of conservative stances
on issues such as abortion rights or a woman’s role in the family by the political
right. The suggestion is that women will oppose these policies more than men.
However, our empirical analysis shows that the issue of abortion rights did not
affect men and women’s political preferences differently. This is in line with
other surveys which consistently show no significant gender differences in either
opinions or intensity of preferences on these issues [Mansbridge 1980; Cook and
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Wilcox 1991].3 We find that the correlation between divorce risk and the gen-
der gap for middle-income respondents is robust to the inclusion of controls for
individual’s attitudes on social and religious issues.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 situates our
paper within the existing literature, and discusses the rationale underpinning
our view of marriage. Section 3 provides a theoretical model that illustrates our
proposed link between marriage, the gender gap, and overall demand for redis-
tribution. Sections 4 and 5 present the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
Evidence of a growing political gender gap, in both redistributive and party
preferences, has been documented in many surveys: for the United States,
the National Election Studies [Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1996; Montgomery
and Stuart 1999]; CBS News and New York Times quarterly surveys [Box-
Steffensmeier, Boef, and Lin 2000]; the General Social Surveys [Shapiro and
Mahajan 1986; Alesina and Ferrara 2000], and for Western European countries,
the World Values Survey [Inglehart and Norris 2000]. In a similar vein, Lott and
Kenny [1999] argued that female suffrage is behind the growth of government.
The papers most closely related to our study are Montgomery and Stuart
[1999] and Box-Steffensmeier, Boef, and Lin [2000]. These papers note that
changing demographics, especially the rise of non-marriage, are correlated with
the emergence of the political gender gap. Our innovation lies in providing an
explanation for the likely effects of marriage on male to female income inequal-
ity, and in identifying several refutable predictions concerning the relationship
between non-marriage, the gender gap, and the overall demand for redistribu-
tion.
2.1 Marriage
We argue that marriage affects male to female income inequality because within
marriage men transfer resources to women in exchange for sex and for access to
children. This is because women are more discriminating than men in partner
selection [Trivers 1972], and are vested with default property rights to the chil-
dren they bear (e.g. Glendon [1996]).4 Family law only recognizes one default
parent, the mother. However, both parents may find it mutually beneficial to
assign parental rights to the father as well. The outright sale of children is
almost universally condemned. However, all known societies have devised con-
tracts that link fathers to their children, and these contracts, however varied,
are known as marriage (e.g. Morgan [1877]; Mair [1953]; Posner [1992]). Hence,
3For instance, the General Social Surveys show that 41 percent of men and 39 percent of
women supported abortion on request by the woman (question was asked in 1977-2000), and
that 72 percent of men and 75 percent of women favored the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
(question asked in 1982), authors’ calculations.
4Both of these reasons may stem from the fact that already at conception, the female has
made a greater parental investment than the male [Trivers 1972].
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one way to understand marriage is to view it as a contract under which women
provide men with parental rights (Edlund [1998]), and in the majority of cases,
also sex.5 If women are compensated for this transfer, a decline in marriage
may represent a shortfall in income for women.
This view of family formation is consistent with several stylized facts: women,
on average, earn less than men; spouses’ potential earnings are positively corre-
lated [Becker 1991; Mare 1991; Qian and Preston 1993; Juhn and Murphy 1997];
high male relative to female earnings is conducive to marriage [Blackwell and
Lichter 2000; Blau, Kahn, and Waldfogel 2000]; on divorce, female income falls
substantially, with remarriage the main route to economic recovery [Weitzman
1985; Duncan and Hoffman 1985; Duncan and Hoffman 1988; Page and Stevens
2001].
Moreover, this view of marriage, unlike that proposed by Becker [1973], can
account for the absence of negative sorting in the marriage market despite an in-
creasing number of career oriented women – women in high powered professions
rarely marry men who specialize in so called household production.
Another shortcoming of the framework proposed by Becker is that it is ill-
suited to explain out-of-wedlock fertility, a family form that involves children,
possibly cohabitation, but not marriage; or polygamy, a family form that in-
volves marriage and children, but not necessarily cohabitation. By contrast,
this paper’s proposed view of marriage is consistent with all known forms of
marriage, including polyandry, polygyny, time limited marriages [Posner 1992],
marriages that continue after the death of the husband [Mair 1953], and many
aspects of prostitution [Edlund and Korn 2002]. It is also consistent with the
observation that marriage can be a source of income for women (e.g. Ellis [1936];
Goldin [1997]) and women only;6 the empirical rejection of the unitary house-
hold model [Udry 1996; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997]; and many aspects
of non-marriage.
2.2 The rise of non-marriage
The last three decades have witnessed a rapid decline in marriage, driven by
delayed age of first marriage, increased out-of-wedlock childbearing, and divorce.
Marriage has always been a more tenuous affair among the poor (e.g. Myrdal
[1944]; Go¨ransson [1993]; Smith [1996]; Edin and Lein [1997]), and the recent
decline started earlier, and has been more dramatic, among low income groups.
For instance, between 1972 and 1987, the marriage rate fell by 58 percent, 42
percent and 24 percent for men with less than high school education, high school
5Rape in marriage is only recently recognized, and in some U.S. states is treated more
leniently than rape outside marriage. Moreover, consistent with the view that women sell sex
to men, rape may be considered theft and rape of a woman a more serious offence than rape
of a man [Posner 1992].
6The Napoleonic Code states that “The husband owes protection to his wife, the wife
obedience to her husband. The wife is obliged to live with her husband, and to follow him to
every place where he may judge it convenient to reside: the husband is obliged to receive her,
and to furnish her with every thing necessary for the wants of life, according to his means and
station.” Book 1, title V, chapter VI.
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education, and some college education, respectively [Qian and Preston 1993].
We outline possible explanations for this development, and their implications
for male-female inequality.
Contraceptives If marriage is a contract in which women provide sex, then a
possible reason for the fall in marriage may be lower male willingness to pay for
this. The oral contraceptive is a female controlled, low cost contraceptive that
was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1960. It is a prescription
drug that initially was only available to married women, but became available
to unmarried women in the late 1960s [Goldin and Katz 2002]. Abortion is
another female controlled contraceptive. Abortion was legalized in 1970 in five
U.S. states including California and New York, and nationally in 1973 with Roe
v. Wade. While abortion was medically feasible long before that, legalization
lowered its cost.
Female controlled contraceptives lowered women’s marginal cost of supplying
sex. One consequence may have been a reduction in the transfers women receive
in marriage, since male willingness to pay for marriage partially derives from
sexual access. Moreover, those interested in sex, but not children, no longer
needed to marry [Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz 1996]. Hence, these contraceptives
are likely to have reduced male to female income transfers, directly through
lower marriage rates, for instance by raising the age at marriage [Goldin and
Katz 2002], and higher divorce rates, and indirectly in marriage through an
improved male bargaining position.
A potentially linked development was the passage of unilateral divorce laws
in the 1970s, often considered as a proximate cause of increased non-marriage
[Friedberg 1998]. While the reasons for the timing of the divorce law reforms
are not well established, these reforms were preceded by a build up in popular
demand for mutual consent divorce, which may have made their passage, if not
inevitable, the next logical step [Phillips 1988; Glendon 1996]. One should note
that divorce alone does not predict lower transfers to women since if coupled with
remarriage it allows for serial polygyny and thus effectively raises demand for
wives (cf. Becker [1991]). This points to the role of contraceptives in lowering
demand for wives and divorce as a conduit for the subsequent cheapening of
marriage.
Female labor force participation The last three decades have seen a sharp
rise in female labor force participation [Goldin 1990; Costa 2000]. If marriage
is based on comparative advantages, as proposed by Becker [1973], then the
narrowing of the gender wage gap seemingly suggests an explanation for the
fall in marriage: lower gains from trade. However, given the rise in high wage
women, and the worsening labor market for low skilled men, it is unclear whether
gains from trade have actually diminished.
Alternatively, if a man’s role in marriage is to be the provider then women’s
greater earnings ability may imply a decline in marriage (e.g. Edlund [1998]).
However, this cannot be the only reason non-marriage rose. If so, we would
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not expect non-marriage to be associated with a feminization of poverty [Fuchs
1989; Smith and Ward 1989].
Welfare Another explanation is that policies which target poor single parent
families, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in particular, have
encouraged non-marital fertility (e.g. Murray [1984]; for recent contributions
see Rosenzweig [1999]; Nechyba [2001]). AFDC afforded low income women
the possibility of having children independently of a male provider (marriage).
However, its level was too low to affect marital decisions of individuals other than
the very poor.7 The growing prevalence of non-marriage increasingly involves
groups not directly affected by welfare policies.
Marriage squeeze Husbands tend to be older than their wives. This can
give rise to a marriage squeeze if cohorts are of different sizes. Grossbard-
Shechtman [1993] proposed that the baby-boom that followed World War II
created a marriage squeeze for women in the mid-1960s to early 1970s and men
in the early 1980s, and that this prompted the observed changes in marriage
patterns. According to this theory, the marriage market for females should have
improved in the early 1980s. However, marriage has declined steadily since the
mid-1960s. Moreover, it is unclear whether the magnitude of the effect was
sufficient to cause a substantial reduction in male transfers to women. Other
than a marriage squeeze, variations in cohort sizes can be absorbed through
an adjustment of the spousal age gap. Finally, sex ratios have varied before,
without the posited effect.8
3 Model
This section provides a simple model of how increased non-marriage can af-
fect individual political preferences, and how this, in turn, alters the aggregate
demand for redistribution.
3.1 Economic and political environment
Consider a large population of equally many men and women. Let i be a contin-
uous within gender income rank index, i ∈ [0, 1]. Both men and women supply
one unit of labor. Earnings 0 ≤ y <∞ are distributed according to the density
function f(y) for women and m(y) for men, with the corresponding cumulative
distribution functions F (y), M(y). Moreover, assume that f(·) and m(·) have
compact supports, share a common lower support, and that F (0) =M(0). y¯ is
7For instance, in 1993, the maximum AFDC for a family of three was $367 a month in
Illinois, the median state in this respect [Edin and Lein 1997, p. 35].
8For instance, the United States suffered roughly 290,000 military casualties in World
War II [Britannica Online], the vast majority of whom were young and male. This should
have tilted the balance against marriage for women in the 1950s – a decennium in which the
breadwinner-housewife model was at its apogee.
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the unconditional mean of y. ymi and yfi are the incomes of man i and woman
i respectively.
We assume the male income distribution first order stochastically dominates
the female, where the dominance is strict at (at least) the mean income y.
Assumption 1 F (y) ≥M(y), and F (y) > M(y).
Two parties, Left and Right, compete in elections. These parties favor dif-
ferent redistributive policies: the Left full, and the Right no, redistribution. We
assume no policy commitment on the part of parties such that, conditional on
being elected, the Left party will implement full redistribution with all citizens
will enjoy the same post tax income of y, while the Right party will choose zero
redistribution. Taxation is assumed to take place on a household per capita
bases, i.e. the household income divided by the number of members (one or
two).9
In this environment sincere voting is optimal. Moreover, we assume that
utility increases in income. It follows that those with income below mean income
y favor the Left, and those with income above y the Right.10
3.2 Marriage
We need to make assumptions both on sorting and income sharing within mar-
riage. We assume sorting is positive on income y, implying that woman imarries
man i. Within marriage, we assume men and women obtain a fixed share of
household income, for simplicity, 50/50.11
Individuals may or may not be married; we refer to the proportion of non-
married individuals as the non-marriage rate. Let ν(i) be the non-marriage rate
at i, and ∆ ν(i) the change in non-marriage at i.12 Then ν =
∫ 1
0
ν(i) di is the
aggregate non-marriage rate, and ∆ ν =
∫ 1
0
∆ ν(i) di the change in the aggregate
non-marriage rate.
In keeping with stylized facts, we assume non-marriage is weakly decreasing
in income:
Assumption 2 ν(i)− ν(j) ≥ 0, i < j.
Non-marriage can still take many forms. We distinguish between two cases
depending on whether it is uniform across incomes, or strictly decreasing, some
i, j:
Case 1 ν(i) = ν,
9Qualitatively similar results would result as long as the higher income spouse (the man)
pay higher taxes and receive fewer transfers when single than married, and the converse is
true of the lower income spouse (the woman).
10Cut off income would be greater than y¯ under progressive taxation.
11Any form of fixed income shares align household members’ redistributive preferences.
12ν(i) can be interpreted either as the probability of non-marriage for man and woman i,




Case 2 ν(i)− ν(j) ≥ 0, i < j and ν(i)− ν(j) > 0, some i < j.
Moreover, an important sub-case of the latter is when non-marriage is restricted
to the poor:
Case 3 ν(i) = 1 for i ≤ ν and 0 otherwise.
3.3 Income distributions
Let p(ν; y) and P (ν; y) denote the population income density and cumulative




It is useful to define the following income ranks (see figure 0):
iM ≡M(y¯), iP ≡ P (0; y¯), iF ≡ F (y¯).
Definition 1 i ∈ [iM , iF ] is the middle-class, with i ∈ [iM , iP ] constituting the
lower middle-class, and i ∈ (iP , iF ] the upper middle-class. Moreover, i < iM
is the lower class and i > iF the upper class.
Table 1 summarizes individual income, relative to mean income: the first
and second columns give non-married female and male income respectively, and
the third column married male and female income. Since per capita income
determines party preference, only the middle-class’ political preferences change
with marital status. Non-marriage causes lower middle-class men to favor the
Right, and upper middle-class women to favor the Left. Note that, if women
are sufficiently poor relative to men, then the upper-class need not exist.
Table 1: Income relative to y¯, by class
Class non-married woman non-married man married
lower class < < <
lower middle-class < > <
upper middle-class < > >
upper class > > >
Clearly, the relative sizes of the upper and lower middle-classes determines
overall support for the Left.
Condition 1 iP − iM < iF − iP .
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Under condition 1 the upper middle-class is larger than the lower-middle-
class. In this case marriage pulls more women above the mean income than it
pushes men below. The condition holds if f(y) and m(y) are symmetric, single
peaked, and share a common lower support.13
3.4 Gender gap
We now examine how increased non-marriage affects male to female political
preferences. Let lf be the share of women, and lm the share of men, who favor
the Left. We define the gender gap as
γ = lf − lm
Clearly, γ = 0 corresponds to no gender gap in political preferences, and γ > 0
to a leftist gender gap, where relative to men a higher proportion of women
favor the Left. The fixed-shares sharing rule in marriage implies that there is
no gender gap when everyone is married, i.e. γ|ν=0 = 0.
13Numerical simulations show that condition 1 holds if f(·) and m(·) are log-normal.
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Proposition 1 Positive non-marriage corresponds to a gender gap (γ ≥ 0).
The gap is strictly positive if there is non-marriage among the middle-class.
Proof. Table 1 shows γ = 0 if ν = 0, and that non-marriage only affects
the political preferences of the middle-class. Non-marriage among the lower
middle-class creates a gender gap as men shift to favoring the Right over the
Left; while non-marriage among the upper middle-class creates a gender gap by
shifting women from the Right to the Left.
Proposition 2 The gender gap increases in non-marriage if and only if non-
marriage increases among the middle-class.
Proof. For the lower class, both male and female incomes are below y
irrespective of marital status. Hence, an increase in ν leaves their political
preferences unaffected. For the lower middle-class, male incomes exceed y. Here,
an increase in ν(i) leaves female political preferences unaffected but results in
∆ ν(i) men favoring for the Right over the Left. For the upper middle-class, an
increase in ν(i) leaves male political preferences unaffected but results in ∆ ν(i)
women favoring the Left over the Right. Finally, for the upper class, changes
in non-marriage do not affect political preferences since, irrespective of marital
status, male and female incomes exceed y¯.
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that the gender gap is driven by non-marriage
amongst the middle-class. Further, as long as non-marriage among the middle-
class increases over time, we would expect a concurrent widening of the gender
gap.
3.5 Marriage gap
This section investigates how non-marriage affects the marriage gap, i.e. the
tendency for married individuals to increasingly support the Right (relative to
the non-married). Let µ denote the marriage gap where µ > 0 if, relative to the
non-married, a higher proportion of married individuals favor the Right.
Proposition 3 Condition 1 is a sufficient condition for positive non-marriage
to correspond to a marriage gap.
Proof.
Case 1: µ is determined by the difference in preference for the Right when
ν = 0 and ν = 1. µ > 0 if condition 1 holds, and negative otherwise.
For case 2, condition 1 is a sufficient condition for µ > 0 if ν(i) > ν(j) some
i ∈ [iM , iP ], j ∈ [iP , iF ]. The reason is that (compared to the uniform case)
there are fewer married people among the lower middle-class and more married
people among the upper middle-class. Case 3 is a sub-case of case 2.
The relationship between µ and the non-marriage rate depends on the form of
∆ ν. If non-marriage is restricted to the poor (case 3) then it is straightforward
that the marriage gap increases with non-marriage i.e. µ(ν), µ′(ν) > 0 for ν < iP
(see proof of proposition 1, and figures A and B, appendix). If non-marriage
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is uniform across income (case 1) then µ is invariant to the non-marriage rate.
Finally if non-marriage decreases with income (case 2) then whether higher non
marriage implies higher µ depends on how its incidence varies with income.
3.6 Demand for redistribution
We now examine how non-marriage alters the popular support for redistribution,
and therefore for the Left. The popular support for the Left is
l = (lf + lm)/2.
We start by analyzing case 3, i.e. when non-marriage is limited to the poor.
Proposition 4 If ν(i) = 1, i ≤ ν and 0 otherwise, then an increase in non-
marriage:
• lowers support for the Left if ν ∈ [iM , iP ];
• raises support for the Left if ν ∈ [iP , iF ].
Proof. In case 3, l(ν) and
(1) l′(ν) =

0 if ν < iM ,
< 0 if iM < ν < iP ,
> 0 if iP < ν < iF ,
0 if i > iF .
Corollary 1 In case 3, increasing non-marriage leads to lower middle-class
men switching to the Right before upper middle-class women shift Left
Clearly, if l(0) = 0.5 then men who switch to favoring the Right when ν ∈
[iM , iP ] will be pivotal for the Right. Whether the women who switch Left for
ν ∈ [iP , iF ] can tip the balance in favor of redistribution depends on whether
their group size exceeds that of lower middle-class men. This will be the case
if condition 1 holds, and non-marriage is sufficiently high, i.e. ν > 2iP − iM .
In any circumstance, non-marriage leads lower middle-class men and upper-
middle-class women to have political preferences at variance with their class.14
Moreover, if non-marriage first increase among the poor (the lower middle-
class and below), and then spread to the upper middle-class, then there would
be a sequential emergence of men who swing right, and women women who
swing left. If so, our model may shed some light on the emergence of the so
called ‘Reagan Democrats’, blue-collar men whose support was deemed critical
for the Republican party’s electoral success in the 1980s, followed by the ‘Soccer
Moms’, suburban women who switched from being traditionally Republican to
voting for Clinton in the 1996 election.
Does proposition 4 hold under more general conditions on ν(·)? Intuitively,
it will if ν(·) resembles case 3 enough. To see this, consider the two other cases:
14If by that is meant what the class favors in the absence of non-marriage.
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Case 1: Support for the left is a monotone function of non-marriage i.e,




> 0 if condition 1 holds,
< 0 otherwise,
since iP − iM < iF − iP ⇔ P (1; y¯) > P (0; y¯). Under condition 1 marriage
pulls more women above the mean income than it pushes men below it.
Hence, relative to the situation when everybody is married, non-marriage
increases the popular support for redistribution.
Case 2: The effect is ambiguous. Under condition 1, support for the Left
follows equation 1 or equation 2. The more ν(·) resembles case 3, the
more likely it follows equation 1 and non-marriage increases support for
Left. However, violation of condition 1 implies that higher non-marriage
rates lowers support for the Left.
Eventually, higher non-marriage rates increase popular support for redistri-
bution if condition 1 holds. This suggests one reason why fiscally liberal parties
have espoused conservative social policies that purportedly encourage marriage.
Namely, that the income distribution associated with higher rates of marriages
favors the Right. Moreover, we would expect such policies to be championed by
the Right only when non-marriage begins to mainly affect the upper middle-class
3.7 Extensions
Endogenous Labor Supply It is well established that labor supply is en-
dogenous to, inter alia, marital status, and taxation. If men work more when
married, the gender gap from non-marriage is attenuated. However, as long as
male per capita income is lower when married than when not, our qualitative
results hold. A similar logic applies if women work more when non-married as
long as non-marriage lowers female per capita income. The difference is that the
class whose political preferences are influenced by marriage would be [iMˆ , iFˆ ],
where iM < iMˆ , and iFˆ < iF .
Moreover, under endogenous labor supply the Left party would favor less
than full redistribution. However, as long as the Left chooses positive taxation,
and redistribution is via a lump sum anonymous transfer, only those with less
that the mean income will favor redistribution.
Children An important implication of increasing non-marriage has been changes
in the living arrangements of children. Compared to the 1960s a higher propor-
tion of children today live in female headed households, suggesting that male
and female preferences over child targeted transfers are likely to have diverged
over this period. To examine the political implications of such a divergence we
14
briefly consider the case where the Left offers targeted child transfers, while the
Right continues to choose zero redistribution.
Assume every woman has one child. Further, while women always enjoy
child custody, only married men have (equal) custodial rights. Let redistribution
take the form of a cash transfer to children, administered by the custodian(s).
Clearly, when everyone is married there is no gender gap, γ|ν=0 = 0. If, instead,
everybody is non-married, then women with income yF ≤ 2y¯ favor the Left,
while all men favor the Right. Hence, γ|ν=1 > 0 and l|ν=1 ≤ 0.5.
In this world non-marriage leads to a gender gap, i.e. proposition 2 holds.
However, relative to the situation when everyone is married, popular support
for the Left is lower in the complete absence of marriage.
4 Empirics - National Election Studies
This section presents evidence on how increases in aggregate divorce risk have
impacted on the political gender gap. Our data are drawn from the biennial
National Election Studies (NES), for individual level information, and the March
Current Population Surveys, for state-level aggregates, and span the period 1964
to 1996.
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We restrict the sample to the period 1964 to 1996, and respondents aged 18-64.
This leaves us with 17 survey rounds and approximately 1,400 respondents per
survey. The average respondent was 39 years, 54 percent were female, and 65
percent married (Table 2).
Roughly 90 percent of the respondents had at least completed grade school,
and 80 percent were in the labor force at the survey date. The NES only iden-
tifies a respondent’s annual family income percentile. We distinguish between
three income groups: (i) 0-33 percentile (poor); (ii) 34-95 percentile (middle
income); and (iii) 96-100 percentile (rich). Since, relative to the per capita in-
come distribution, such a classification places unmarried respondents “too low”
and married respondents “too high”, our regressions allow income coefficients
to vary by marital status.
To avoid sample selection issues related to actual voting we measure a re-
spondent’s political preferences as his/her stated partisan identification. The
survey question asks respondents to indicate party preference on a seven point
scale ranging from ‘Strong Democrat’ to ‘Strong Republican’. We collapse re-
sponses to this question to a dummy measure ‘idemocrat’ which equals 1 if
respondent stated self to be a Strong-, Weak- or Independent-leaning Demo-
crat.15 54 percent of female, and 48 percent of male, respondents identified
themselves as idemocrat.
15We find qualitatively similar results using a stronger measure of political affiliation:
‘democrat’, a dummy variable that equals 1 only if the respondent stated self to be a Strong
or Weak Democrat.
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To ascertain that an individual’s party and redistributive preferences are
aligned we use a direct measure of individual redistributive preferences as an
alternative dependent variable. The dummy ‘govspend’ equals 1 if the respon-
dent states that the government should provide many services (and implicitly
increase spending and taxes). Men were less likely than women to support more
government services, 48 percent compared to 55 percent. This variable is only
available since 1982.
To examine whether male to female differences on social issues, rather than
income differences, lie behind the emergence of the political gender gap we make
use of attitudinal questions on women’s issues (abortion and equal roles), the
relative political salience of social, welfare, and economic issues for the respon-
dent, and religiosity. There were no significant gender differences on women’s
issues and the salience of social issues. However, more women emphasized wel-
fare issues. Religiosity exhibited significant gender differences; 54 percent of
female, but only 41 percent of male, respondents attended church regularly.
We proxy for the divorce risk facing an individual by two different aggregate
measures. Our first measure, pdivorced, is the divorce incidence in a state,
as captured by the proportion of adult population that is currently divorced.
This variable is constructed from March Current Population Survey data. To
ensure representativeness, our unit of aggregation is the ‘CPS-state’ which often
includes multiple US states. Overall, there are 21 CPS-states (for details, see
Appendix).
Our second measure, unilat, is the passage of unilateral divorce laws by
U.S. states. This captures changes in divorce risk arising from alterations in the
legal framework governing marriage dissolution. Following Gruber [2000] we
define unilateral divorce to be available when divorce can be filed on a no-fault
ground, and there is no separation requirement. Thus the unilat variable equals
0 until the year these laws were introduced, and then 1. Appendix Table A.1
provides state-wise information on the year unilateral divorce laws were passed
from Gruber [2000], and the party identity of the then state’s governor. Over
our sample period, Democrat and Republican governors were equally likely to
pass such laws, suggesting bi-partisan support.
4.2 Basic results
In order to provide a baseline against which we can compare subsequent findings,
we examine how the political gender gap varied across years. We estimate an
OLS linear probability regression of the form:
(3) dikt = ck + τ t + φ1fikt + φ2(fikt × τ t) + εikt,
where dikt is the idemocrat dummy for individual i, ck are CPS-state dum-
mies, τ t are year dummies, fikt is a female dummy (‘female’ in text). The co-
efficient φ2 provides a measure of the trend in, and φ1 + φ2 the level of, the
gender gap unexplained by our controls.
Table 3, column (1), reports the results. While the regression includes the
full set of ‘female×year’ interaction terms, to avoid clutter Table 3 only reports
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the coefficients for Presidential election years. Relative to 1964 (the omitted
year), apart from 1972, no significant gender gap exists until 1980. However,
with the exception of 1990, all years since 1980 show a significant Democratic
gender gap. Comparing point estimates, the gender gap rose sharply in the
early 1980s, then stabilized and fell, before rising again in the 1990s. To use
popular parlance, the first phase corresponded to the “Reagan Democrat” years
and the last to the “Soccer Mom” years.
To investigate the relative roles of individual characteristics and divorce risk
in explaining this trend we re-estimate the above regression and sequentially
include these two sets of covariates. Our final regression is of the form:
(4)
dikt = ck+τ t+φ1fikt+φ2(fikt×τ t)+φ3Xikt+φ4(fikt×ck)+φ5νkt+φ6(fikt×νkt)+εikt,
where Xikt is the vector of individual demographic and economic controls.
νkt is our primary measure of divorce risk, pdivorced, that varies by year and
CPS-state. In all regressions we cluster standard errors by CPS-state. This is
to correct for two potential problems. First, grouped error terms which arises
from the fact that our unit of observation, the individual, varies at a more
disaggregate level than pdivorced. Second, pdivorced is serially correlated.
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan [2001] show that such clustering can help
reduce the bias in standard errors that this causes.
Table 3, column (2) reports results for the regression which includes indi-
vidual demographic controls. Consistent with existing research, we find that
Black, Catholic, Jewish, and older respondents are significantly more likely
to be idemocrat. Column (3) includes information on economic attributes.
Democratic support falls monotonically with education. Poor and middle in-
come individuals are more favorable towards the Democratic party than the
rich. However, the relationship is non-monotone, with the poor less likely to
be Democratic than middle income individuals. A potential explanation is that
the poor include individuals with high life-time income, for instance, college
students. Comparing across columns (1)-(3) we see that the inclusion of indi-
vidual controls improves our regression fit, but does not explain the trend in
the gender gap.
As a precursor to analyzing the role of pdivorced in explaining this gen-
der gap column (4) reports regressions which include a set of interaction terms
‘female×CPS-state’. The latter accounts for omitted CPS-state variables which
affect men and women differentially. These interaction terms are jointly signifi-
cant in explaining Democratic party affiliation, but not in explaining the trend
in the political gender gap.
Finally, column (5) includes our measure of divorce risk – pdivorced and
‘female×pdivorced’ – as explanatory variables. The coefficients on the controls
for individual characteristics remain unaffected. However, both the economic
magnitude and the statistical significance of the ‘female×year’ set of interaction
terms are dramatically lowered. No significant unexplained trend in the gender
gap remains after 1980. Figure IV illustrates how the inclusion of pdivorced
improves our ability to predict the trend in the gender gap, it graphs the sets
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of coefficients on the ‘female×year’ terms reported in Table 3, columns (1), (3)
and (5) respectively.
Between 1964 and 1996 the gender gap increased by 13.4 percentage points,
and pdivorced from 3 to 10 percent. A back of the envelope calculation using
the point estimate for ‘female×pdivorced’ in column (5) suggests that the rise
in pdivorced can explain a gender gap of 12.6 percentage points, or 94 percent
of the observed gap.
Table 4 investigates how the impact of pdivorced on political preferences
varies with income group and marital status. The endogenous nature of indi-
vidual income and marital status raises the concern that selectivity bias may
underlie apparent income group or marital status effects. We, therefore, first
report results for the entire sample, and for each income group provide two
specifications: one which does not distinguish between individuals by marital
status, and one which does. All regressions include the individual controls in
Table 3, column (5) except the income co-variates in specifications that divide
the sample by income groups (columns (3)-(8)).
Table 4, columns (1) and (2) report results for the entire sample. Comparing
across the two we find that pdivorced does not affect the political preferences
of married and unmarried respondents differentially. As this is the case for all
specifications we consider, in subsequent Tables we do not report specifications
which control for marital status. Columns (3)-(8) report results by income
group. An increase in pdivorced is associated with a statistically significant
Democratic gender gap only for the middle income group (percentiles ‘34-95’).
Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is largest for this group. Among the
middle income group, increased divorce risk turns men away from the left. A
one percentage point increase in divorce risk lowers the likelihood that a male
respondent is a idemocrat by 2.7 percentage points, but leaves that of women
unchanged (column (5)). Within this group we find that, relative to non-married
women, married women are significantly less likely to be idemocrat. However,
the impact of divorce risk on women’s political preferences does not differ by
marital status.
4.3 Robustness
How well does an individual’s party affiliation, as captured by idemocrat,
correlate with his/her redistributive preferences? To examine this, Table 5
reports results for regressions which use a measure of individual redistributive
preferences, govspend, as the dependent variable. Column (1) reports results
for the entire sample. Increases in pdivorced have a significant and differential
effect on male and female redistributive preferences. Columns (2)-(3) estimate
this regression by income group. As with party affiliation, the differential effect
of divorce risk on male and female political preferences is limited to the middle
income group.
The results in Tables IV and V paint a consistent picture of how increased
divorce risk affects the political preferences of the middle income group. How-
ever, there are differences in how divorce risk affects men and women’s party
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affiliations and redistributive preferences. First, at 32 percentage points, the re-
distributive preference gender gap is more than double the Democratic gender
gap. Second, increased divorce risk alters men’s party affiliation but women’s
desire for redistribution. Taken together, these findings are suggestive of a shift
in party platforms.
The other measure of divorce risk we explore is the passage of unilateral
divorce laws, unilat. Table 6 presents the results for this measure. Column
(1) tells us that the liberalization of divorce laws was associated with the emer-
gence of a political gender gap. Moreover, this effect varied by income group.
The passage of unilateral divorce laws left the political preferences of the rich
unaffected (column (4)), but had a gender differential effect on the political
preferences of the middle income group (column (3)). For this group easier di-
vorce made men, but not women, abandon the Democratic party. These results
are consistent with our findings for pdivorced. The only difference is that, un-
like pdivorced, the passage of unilateral divorce laws also affected the political
preferences of the poor. Easier divorce made women more likely to identify with
the Democratic party. This last effect is sensitive to the introduction of controls
for marital status – introduction of marital status controls suggests that this
effect is primarily driven by married women.
Arguably, the impact of pdivorced on expected income, and therefore po-
litical preferences, should be more muted for the young or old. Moreover, if ag-
gregate divorce risk is primarily driven by divorce among the young to middle-
aged, we would expect movements in aggregates to concern older individuals
less. Dividing the sample by age we find that increases in pdivorced were as-
sociated with a political gender gap among the 25-40 age group but not among
the younger or the older (Table 7, columns (1)-(3)). Furthermore, to check that
racial differences in marriage patterns and political behavior do not drive our
results, we re-estimated our regressions for the sample of White respondents
(Table 7, column (4)).16 Lastly, to check that the results are not sensitive to
the choice of a linear specification, we also used a Probit specification (Table 7,
columns (5)). Throughout, our main results remain robust.
4.4 Competing hypotheses
This Section provides evidence on three alternative explanations for the emer-
gence of the political gender gap: female labor force participation, women’s
issues, and religious and social values.
Female labor force participation The increase in female labor force partic-
ipation over the last three decades has been accompanied by changes in female
educational profile, own-earned income, and social and political attitudes. An
16If, ideologically, feminism shared common ground with the civil rights movement, we
might expect the gender gap and the Black-White gap to exhibit similar trends. However,
this was not the case. Black support for the Democratic party increased dramatically in
the first half of the 1960s, peaked at over 90 percent in 1968, and has since been falling off.
Moreover, Black men rather than Black women led this early shift to the Democratic party.
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alternative hypothesis is that the political gender gap was engendered by the
social and economic changes wrought by women’s mobilization into the labor
force.
We test this hypothesis in two ways. First, we examine whether being in
the labor force affects male and female political preferences differentially (Table
8). The relationship between pdivorced and the political gender gap is robust
to including this information. Relative to a man, labor force participation only
affects the political preferences of middle income women. Being in the labor
force makes a middle income woman (relative to a man) 11 percentage points
more likely to be an idemocrat (column (3)). The response to own labor force
participation among middle income women is consistent with an interpretation
of women’s working (for this group) being associated with a more precarious
economic situation.
Second, we examine whether changes in the proportion of women in the
labor force in a CPS-state (denoted as plabor) affect political preferences.17
Between 1964 and 1996 plabor rose from 44 to 71 percent. It is possible that
increases in this aggregate were correlated with changing attitudes which, in
turn, altered men and women’s political preferences. Alternatively, if increases
in plabor are associated with increased non-marriage, then the effects we at-
tribute to pdivorcedmay simply proxy for labor market effects. Table 8 reports
the results for regressions which include plabor. Amongst the poor and middle
income group we find no effect (columns (2) and (4)). Instead amongst the rich
increases in plabor increase male sympathy for the Democratic party, while
women are largely unmoved (column (6)). This suggests that among the rich,
increases in aggregate female labor force participation muted rather than con-
tributed to the political gender gap. Throughout, our main results for divorce
risk remain robust to the inclusion of labor force participation variables.
Social and religious values In Table 9 we provide evidence on how changing
social and religious values have impacted on male and female political prefer-
ences. We first consider changing attitudes on women’s issues. The past three
decades have seen women’s issues become politically divisive. In particular,
the Democratic party has come to champion abortion rights (vested with the
woman) and the Republican party the ‘pro-life’ position. Republicans have also
become associated with so called family values that prescribe a traditional home-
making role for women. It is commonly believed that these policy differences
have divided the electorate along gender lines. Moreover, some believe that the
onset of feminism and increasing male to female differences on women’s issues
lie behind the rise in non-marriage. If correct, we may have mis-attributed the
impact of women’s issues on the political gender gap to increased divorce risk.
Rows (1) and (2), Table 9, explore this possibility by examining how re-
spondent’s attitudes on these issues condition his/her political preferences. In
row (1) we include a dummy for whether the respondent supports a woman’s
right to choose abortion (‘pro-choice’). Respondents who are pro-choice are 6
17plabor is constructed from March Current Population Surveys
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percentage points more likely to identify themselves as idemocrat (a slightly
higher percentage of men than women are pro-choice). Moreover, relative to
men, women who are pro-choice are 3 percentage points more likely to favor the
left. The latter effect is, however, statistically insignificant once we control for
marital status.
To examine how feminist sympathies affect political preferences row (2) in-
cludes information on whether the respondent believes men and women should
have an equal role in society. Respondents who believe in equal roles are 3 per-
centage points more likely to be idemocrat. Moreover, relative to men, women
who believe in equal roles are 4 percentage points more likely to favor the left.
The estimated relationship between divorce risk and male to female political
preferences remains robust to the inclusion of these attitude variables. While
clearly shaping political preferences, the relatively weak gender differential ef-
fects associated with women’s issues suggests that the parties’ diverging stance
on these issues has not been an important determinant of the gender gap.
The second possibility we consider is whether gender differences in the po-
litical salience attached to social and economic issues drove the gender gap.
We construct three dummies: ‘social’ which equals 1 if the respondent believed
the most important problem facing the nation related to public order issues
including crime, civil rights and social, religious or moral decay; ‘economics’
which equals 1 if the respondent believed the most important problem facing
the nation related to economic, business and consumer issues; and ‘welfare’
which equals 1 if the respondent believed the most important problem related
to welfare issues such as child care, education, the elderly, health care.
Slightly more women than men consider social issues to be the most impor-
tant issue. While respondents who believe social issues to be the most important
are 7 percentage points less likely to be idemocrat, this effect does not vary
by gender. More men than women consider ‘economics’ to be the most salient
issue. However, this view does not significantly impact on party affiliation for
either sex. By contrast, those who consider ‘welfare’ to be the most important
issue are 8 percentage points more likely to favor the left and within this group
it is men who are the most left-leaning (row (3)). A possible explanation is
sample selection: markedly more women than men held this view.
Finally, we consider the role of religion. The last three decades have seen a
marked decline in both religiosity, and “moral values”. At the same time, polit-
ically active religious movements such as the Moral Majority and the Christian
Coalition emerged, movements which are mainly associated with the Republi-
can party. While women are traditionally portrayed as the bedrock of religiosity
and public morality, one may wonder whether the decline in religiosity affected
women to a greater extent and thereby led to a political gender gap.
Row (4) explores this possibility. Our main result remains robust: higher di-
vorce risk turn middle income men, but not women, away from the Democratic
party. While religious denomination is a significant predictor of political behav-
ior, there are no significant gender differences in the extent to which religious
belief conditions political behavior. In contrast the intensity of religious belief,
as captured by frequency of church attendance, affects male and female political
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behavior differentially. The dummy variable ‘church’ equals 1 if the respondent
attended church at least twice a month. Controlling for religious denomination,
we find that church attendance makes women, relative to men, four percentage
points less likely to be an idemocrat. While suggesting that the decline in
church attendance has made women less right-leaning, this finding raises the
question of why less religious women favor the left.
5 Marital status and political preferences: evi-
dence from longitudinal data
In the NES data we found a strong positive correlation between aggregate di-
vorce risk and the political gender gap. Here, we complement the analysis with
longitudinal data. Longitudinal data allow us to examine how actual changes
in an individual’s marital status impact on his/her political preferences. Our
analysis exploits the observation that changes in own marital status are not
fully anticipated. Hence the realization of such a change is a valid instrument
for changing individual expectation regarding marital status.
We use the three publicly available waves of the Youth Parent Socialization
Survey (YPSS).18 This survey started in the spring of 1965 with a national
survey of high school seniors. Subsequent surveys were conducted in 1973 and
1982. A total of 1,135 respondents (567 men and 568 women) completed all three
waves, providing an unadjusted retention rate of 68 percent.19 Respondents were
18 years old in the first wave and 35 in the last.
5.1 Characteristics of YPSS respondents
Descriptive statistics for the YPSS sample are presented in Table ??. The sam-
ple design implies that all respondents had at least completed high school. The
earnings distribution reflects the fact that the average educational attainment in
the sample exceeded the national average. Only 10 percent of the respondents
in 1973, and 14 percent in 1982, were in the bottom 33 percentile of the national
income distribution. For this reason (and because of the relatively small sample
size) we do not report results separately by income group.
63 percent of the men and 73 percent of the women married between 1965
and 1973. By 1982, 10 percent of female, and 6 percent of male, respondents
had divorced. The survey years also saw most respondents have children. In
1973, 50 percent of the women and 40 percent of the men had at least one child.
By 1982, this figure had risen to over 70 percent for both sexes.
Changes in a respondent’s marital status between 1973 and 1982 affected
his/her income. Irrespective of gender, divorce between 1973 and 1982 lowered
a respondent’s family income. The decline in family income was, however, much
18The survey was designed to specifically study political socialization and conducted by
the Survey Research Center and Center of Political Studies of the University of Michigan
[Jennings and Markus 1984], also see Appendix.
19Jennings and Markus [1984] showed that the attrition cause no apparent bias.
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sharper for a woman who divorced. Conversely, marriage between 1973 and 1982
raised a man’s, but lowered a woman’s, earnings. These effects were mainly
driven by changes in labor supply, especially for women. For this reason we
choose not to use income variables as co-variates in the analysis.
The class of 1965 lay at the heart of the protest generation. In their early
adulthood they were witnesses to sweeping political and social changes such as
the rise of the civil rights and women’s liberation movement. The impact of some
of these events on respondents’ social and political outlooks can be gauged from
the YPSS survey. In 1973 one-third of both male and female respondents favored
equal roles for men and women. By 1982, gender differences had emerged with
52 percent of the women, but only 44 percent of the men, favoring equal roles.
Another indicator of changing social mores is church attendance. Between 1965
and 1973 church attendance fell from over 70 to under 35 percent for both sexes.
Between 1973 and 1982 church attendance recovered, but remained well below
50 percent. Throughout, women were more likely to attend church. Finally,
unionization increased over the period. Although more men than women were
unionized, the increase was marginally greater among women (between 1973
and 1982, unionization increased from 21 to 28 percent among men and 6 to 9
percent among women).
The YPSS and NES survey question on party affiliation are identical. In
addition to idemocrat, we also use a stronger measure of Democrat identifica-
tion democrat as the dependent variable. The latter dummy equals 1 only if
the respondent identifies self as a ‘Strong’ or ‘Weak’ Democrat. Between 1965
and 1982 the proportion of respondents who identified themselves as idemo-
crat fell, with democrat affiliation exhibiting a similar, though non-monotone,
trend. Moreover, relative to non-divorced women, divorced women were more
likely to identify themselves as democrat. The converse was true of divorced
men. Table 13 gives marital status changes between 1973 and 1982, and table
14 shows changes in democrat affiliation between 1973 and 1982 by gender
and marital status changes. It is noteworthy that very woman who identified
as democrat in 1973 and divorced between 1973 and 1982 remained demo-
crat in 1982; while only half of the men who divorced between the last two
survey waves remained democrat in the latter wave. Moreover, while the cate-
gory non-democrat (Republicans and Independents) gained male support, the
gain was greater among men who divorced. The idemocrat measure produced
qualitatively identical, but more muted, results.
5.2 Estimation and results
We use a OLS linear probability regression model to estimate how changes in
individual i’s marital status at time t impact on his/her Democratic affiliation:
(5)
dit = τ t+χi+φ1mit+φ2δit+φ3θit+φ4(fi×mit)+φ5(fi×δit)+φ6(fi×θit)+εit.
where mit is a marriage dummy (‘married’) and δit a divorce dummy (‘di-
vorced’). τ t denotes the year dummies, and χi a time-invariant individual fixed
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effect. Thus, unlike our NES-based analysis which exploited CPS-state-year
variation in divorce rates for identification, this analysis identifies the impact of
marital status on political preferences from changes in individual marital status
between successive waves of the YPSS survey. φ4 and φ5 capture the gender
differential effect of marriage and divorce respectively. Finally, to examine how
other time-varying individual characteristics mediate the relationship between
marital status and political preferences, we sequentially include elements of a
vector of time-varying individual characteristics denoted θit in our regression.
Table 11, column (1), tells us that marriage lowers the likelihood that a
woman, relative to a man, is a democrat. This effect, however, is statistically
indistinguishable from 0. In contrast, divorce has a strong and significant gender
differential effect on political preferences – it makes a man 27 percentage points
less likely to be a democrat. Divorce implies a political gender gap of 38
percentage points. Since roughly 8 percent of the sample were divorced by
1982, a back of the envelop calculation suggests that divorce can account for 3
percentage points (0.08× 0.38) of the gender gap.
Column (2) includes information on whether the respondent has a child, and
on the respondent’s degree of religiosity (as measured by church attendance).
Having a child makes a respondent 10 percentage points less likely to be a
democrat. The effect differs across men and women. It is much more muted
for women, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the negative relationship
between having a child and democrat affiliation is restricted to men. We
speculate that gender differences in preferences for tax financed support of single
parents may lie behind this. Since single parents tend to be mothers, such
support favors mothers over fathers. In contrast, church attendance does not
affect political preferences significantly.
Column (3) includes information on union membership, and the respondent’s
views on gender equality. As information on these two variables is only available
since 1973 the sample size is reduced accordingly. Unionization makes respon-
dents 8 percentage points more likely to be democrat, and there is no evidence
of gender differences. We, however, find no evidence that respondent views on
gender equality impact political preferences.
Columns (4)-(6) reports re-estimates of these regressions, using idemocrat
as the dependent variable. Our findings are qualitatively identical. However,
comparing the effect of divorce on the two measures of political affiliation reveals
interesting differences. Divorce loosens the extent of male Democratic affiliation.
In particular, it significantly lowers the likelihood that a man is a democrat
but not the likelihood that he is a idemocrat. By contrast, divorce makes
erstwhile non-idemocrat women roughly 20 percentage points more likely to
favor the Democratic party. Finally, a broader definition of Democratic affilia-
tion strengthens the positive relationship between unionization and Democratic
affiliation.
The early adulthood years for the class of 1965 coincided with the rise of the
women’s liberation movement. This raises the concern of omitted variable bias.
While we cannot rule out the possibility that, for instance, feminism caused
respondents’ to simultaneously change both their political behavior and their
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marital status, we can test for reverse causality i.e. whether changes in political
preferences presaged divorce. To that end, we ran fixed effect regressions where
the dependent variable was a dummy which equalled one if the respondent
changed marital status between 1973 and 1982 and the explanatory variable of
interest was a dummy for whether the respondent changed political affiliation
between 1965 and 1973. We found that neither leftward nor rightward switches
in political affiliation between 1965 and 1973 predicted divorce between 1973
and 1982, Table 12.
6 Summary and discussion
If marriage transfers resources from men to women, then the dramatic decline in
marriage over the last thirty years made men richer and women poorer. This,
we hypothesize, would impact on the political preferences of middle income
groups but not those of the poor or the rich. We present empirical evidence
consistent with this hypothesis. Increased societal incidence of divorce, or the
actual experience of divorce, both affect men’s and women’s political preferences
in such a way to increase the gender gap, and the effect is largely confined to
the middle income group.
Concurrent with the rise in non-marriage, women improved their ability to
earn their own income, by obtaining better qualifications, and greater accep-
tance at all levels in the workforce. Whilst the changes in the marriage and
labor markets are clearly linked, it is unclear which drove which. The intro-
duction of the Pill may have reduced transfers from men to women, suggesting
that greater female labor market presence is largely a response to this shortfall.
However, this is not to deny the possibility of either a direct labor market ef-
fect on political preferences or that labor market gains outweighed the marriage
market losses for a substantial subset of women. In fact, we find that working
makes middle income women favor the left. Throughout, the gender differential
effect of divorce risk on support for the Democratic party amongst the middle
income group remains robust.
While the discussion centered on how increasing non-marriage affected the
political gender gap, the empirical testing focused on divorce. Divorce is not the
only reason for non-marriage. The age of first marriage has risen, as has the level
of out-of-wedlock fertility. An alternative measure of the rise in non-marriage is
the fall in the proportion of adults who are currently married pmarried. How-
ever, the results are weaker than for the divorce risk proxies and not significant
(Tables 15-19). This is consistent with the view that later age of marriage of-
ten reflects greater human capital investments, especially on the part of women
(possibly in response to increased risk of divorce) and with the fact that in
the United States, out-of-wedlock fertility is so far not common among middle
income groups.
Over the past thirty years, the principal political parties have adopted
sharply diverging stances on social issues [Adams 1997]. It is not immediately
clear how these stances relate to their long-standing ideologies or historical con-
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stituencies. One could argue that the fiscal libertarianism espoused by the Re-
publican party would be a good fit with an equally libertarian position on issues
of personal choice such as abortion. It is equally surprising that the Democrats
should have been willing to alienate the Catholics and evangelical Christians,
groups who have historically formed part of their constituency, by adopting a
pro-life stance [Erikson and Tedin 1994]. One possible explanation afforded by
this paper is that parties adopt social policies that promote family formation
patterns conducive to their preferred redistributive policies.
Finally, the paper suggests a way of measuring the overall changes in the
relative economic fortunes of men and women. Analyzing changes in political
proclivities allows us to examine both the effects of improved labor market op-
portunities for women and the income effects associated with shorter marriages.
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Table 2:
Descriptive statistics 1964-1996 NES, CPS
Percentage
Variable ( Standard deviation)
A. NES data All Men Women
Demographics
married 65.7 69.2 62.1
age [years] 39.2 39.4 39.1
(12.6) (12.5) (12.7)
Black 11.3 9.3 12.9
cohort -1910 3.2 3.2 3.19
1911-42 46.1 45.9 46.2
1943-58 35.5 35.7 35.3
1959- 15.0 14.9 15.1
Economic characteristics
education less than 9 years 9.1 10.0 8.3
9-12 years 50.0 44.3 54.8
some college 21.7 22.5 21.0
college + 19.0 23.0 15.7
in labor force labor 81.5 97.5 68.1
Notes to Table 2
All NES descriptives refer to the sample of 18-64 year old respondents in
the survey years 1964-96 for whom demographic and economic characteristics
are available (N=24,140); with the following exceptions: ‘labor’ (N=23,106)
spans 1968-96; ‘equal roles’ (N=15,812) and ‘pro-choice’ (N=17,470) 1972-96;
govspend (N=9,947) 1982-96; and ‘church’ (N=23,986) 1970-96. ‘social’, ‘eco-
nomics’ and ‘welfare’ are available for the entire period, but missing values
reduces sample size to N=19,903. See Appendix for variable definitions.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 1964-1996 NES, CPS (continued)
Percentage
A. All Men Women
family income
percentile 0-33 26.2 20.4 31.1
34-95 67.8 72.9 63.6
96-100 5.83 6.6 5.1
Preferences
idemocrat 51.8 48.4 54.6
govspend 67.1 60.1 73.6
pro-choice 54.9 55.6 54.3
equal roles 65.6 66.1 65.2
religion Protestant 63.6 60.4 66.3
Catholic 24.2 24.4 24.0
Jewish 2.14 2.33 1.97
church 47.8 40.8 53.6
salient issue social 12.3 11.3 13.1
economics 33.3 37.2 29.9
welfare 22.1 18.6 25.1





number of observations 336
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Notes to Table 3
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering in parentheses. The excluded categories are: female ×
year – 1964; education – ‘college educated’; cohort group – ‘pre-1911’ cohort;
income – ‘96-100’ percentile; CPS-state – 16 (give name of state). Coefficients
for ‘female × year’ interactions are only reported for the years of presidential
elections, however, all regressions include the full set of interaction. ∗ indicates
significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent. Any changes
in the constant term and in the coefficient for female arise from not excluding




Individual determinants of Democratic party identification
Dependent variable: idemocrat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
female -0.005 -0.017 -0.024 -0.034 -0.084∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033)
female × ‘1968’ 0.058 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.036
(0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
female × ‘1972’ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
female × ‘1976’ 0.039 0.046∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.011
(0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033)
female × ‘1980’ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.038
(0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.052)
female × ‘1984’ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.052)
female × ‘1988’ 0.070∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ -0.009
(0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.050)
female × ‘1992’ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.073)
female × ‘1996’ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.074)
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Table 3: Individual determinants of Democratic party identification (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
married – -0.051∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Black – 0.357∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
age – 0.006∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
age2 (×10−3) – -0.051∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
cohort:
1911-1942 – 0.039∗ 0.038∗ 0.038∗ 0.038∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
1942-1952 – 0.052∗ 0.049∗ 0.050∗ 0.050∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
1959- – 0.024 0.016 0.017 0.017
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
religion:
Catholic – 0.077∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Protestant – -0.098∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Jewish – 0.238∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
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Table 3: Individual determinants of Democratic party identification (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
education:
< 9 years – – 0.067∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
9-12 years – – 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)




0-33 – – 0.140∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
34-95 – – 0.153∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
married × – – 0.051∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.051∗∗
‘0-33’ (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
married × – – 0.006 0.007 0.007
‘34-95’ (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
non-marriage:
pdivorced – – – – -2.116∗∗
(0.937)




year yes yes yes yes yes
CPS-state yes yes yes yes yes
female × no no no yes yes
CPS-state
Adj. R2 0.020 0.091 0.097 0.098 0.098
N 26,215 25,848 24,140 24,140 24,140
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Table 4:
Non-marriage and Democratic party identification
Dependent Variable: idemocrat
Family income percentile
All incomes 0-33 34-95 96-100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
female -0.084∗∗ -0.080∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.013 -0.053 -0.251 -0.412∗
(0.033) (0.048) (0.044) (0.053) (0.055) (0.082) (0.153) (0.237)
pdivorced -2.116∗∗ -1.816∗ 0.165 0.581 -2.680∗∗∗ -2.681∗∗∗ -2.137 -2.877
(0.937) (0.999) (1.514) (1.586) (0.986) (0.993) (2.823) (3.061)
female × 1.802∗∗ 1.837∗ -0.516 -1.253 2.656∗∗∗ 3.611∗∗∗ 0.349 1.904
pdivorced (0.921) (1.036) (1.715) (1.741) (0.921) (1.120) (3.672) (4.355)
female × – -0.002 – -0.139∗∗ – 0.047 – 0.212
married (0.043) (0.054) (0.061) (0.234)
pdivorced × – -0.470 – -1.301 – -0.001 – 1.019
married (0.485) (0.809) (0.577) (1.702)
female × – -0.066 – 2.190∗∗∗ – -1.175 – -2.065
pdivorced× (0.557) (0.780) (0.778) (3.224)
married
Adj. R2 0.098 0.098 0.081 0.081 0.096 0.096 0.139 0.139
N 24,140 24,140 6,343 6,343 16,388 16,388 1,409 1,409
Notes to Table 4
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering are reported in parentheses. Controls are included for year
dummies, CPS-state dummies, ‘female × CPS-state’ interactions, and all the
other co-variates in column (5) of Table 3 except that the income co-variates
are not included in specifications that divide the sample by income groups. ∗
indicates significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent. Any
changes in the constant term and in the coefficient for female arise from not




Non-marriage and preference for redistribution
Dependent Variable: govspend
Family income percentile
All incomes 0-33 34-95 96-100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
female -0.280∗∗ -0.470 -0.237 0.281
(0.123) (0.327) (0.161) (0.597)
pdivorced -1.917∗∗ -2.049 -1.923∗ -0.222
(0.912) (3.084) (1.115) (5.439)
female × 4.714∗∗∗ 3.701 5.059∗∗∗ 3.385
pdivorced (1.469) (3.252) (1.860) (5.805)
Adj. R2 0.089 0.039 0.084 0.101
N 9,969 2,505 6,880 584
Notes to Table 5
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering in parentheses. Controls are included for year dummies,
CPS-state dummies, ‘female × CPS-state’ interactions, and all the other co-
variates in column (5) of Table 3 except that the income co-variates are not
included in specifications that divide the sample by income groups. ∗ indicates
significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent. Any changes
in the constant term and in the coefficient for female arise from not excluding







All incomes 0-33 34-95 96-100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
female 0.018 -0.026 0.057∗∗ -0.124
(0.023) (0.042) (0.029) (0.084)
unilat -0.065∗∗∗ -0.051 -0.064∗∗∗ -0.085
(0.022) (0.044) (0.023) (0.067)
female × 0.069∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.087
unilat (0.025) (0.042) (0.033) (0.081)
Adj. R2 0.102 0.089 0.100 0.170
N 24,140 6,343 16,388 1,409
Notes to Table 6
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the state level are reported in parentheses. Controls are included
for year dummies, state dummies, ‘female × state’ interactions, and all the
other co-variates in column (5) of Table 3 except that the income co-variates
are not included in specifications that divide the sample by income groups.
The excluded state in these regressions is 25 (give name of state). ∗ indicates
significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent. There were no
respondents from the following states: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
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Table 7: Alternative specifications for income percentiles 34-95 (NES, CPS)
Dependent variable idemocrat
Age group
18-24 25-40 41-64 Whites Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
female -0.385∗∗∗ -0.107 0.016 0.007 -0.025
(0.090) (0.070) (0.045) (0.057) (0.154)
pdivorced -3.471∗∗ -3.978∗∗∗ 0.167 -1.942∗∗ -7.300∗∗∗
(0.920) (2.702) (1.415) (1.003) (1.297)
female × 1.025 3.813∗∗∗ 0.137 2.747∗∗∗ 8.834∗∗∗
pdivorced (2.263) (1.220) (1.408) (1.035) (2.468)
female × -0.140 -0.266 -0.120 -0.793∗∗∗ -1.808∗∗∗
pdivorced × (0.461) (0.281) (0.328) (0.278) (0.706)
married
Adj. R2 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08a
N 14,784 16,388 3,200 10,489 10,451
Notes to Table 7
Linear probability model, except column (5). ∗ indicates significance at 10%,
∗∗ at 5%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include as co-
variates: all controls included in column (5) of Table 3 except ‘female×year’
dummies. In column (4), pdivorced refers the proportion currently divorced
in the Whites population.
a pseudo R2 for the Probit regression.
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Table 8:




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
female -0.137∗∗ -0.273 -0.086 -0.119 -0.349∗∗∗ 0.882
(0.059) (0.224) (0.083) (0.133) (0.133) (0.659)
pdivorced 0.287 0.781 -2.609∗∗ -2.668∗∗∗ -2.193 -5.496∗∗
(1.483) (1.439) (1.048) (1.006) (2.886) (2.565)
female × -0.507 -0.720 2.410∗∗ 2.312∗∗ 2.058 5.647∗
pdivorced (1.776) (1.754) (0.986) (1.075) (3.788) (3.004)
labor -0.001 -0.000 -0.050 -0.049 -0.048 -0.058
(0.035) (0.035) (0.052) (0.052) (0.144) (0.139)
female × 0.000 -0.000 0.111∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.096 0.105
labor (0.035) (0.035) (0.053) (0.053) (0.163) (0.159)
plabor – -0.737 – 0.054 – 2.986∗∗∗
(0.677) (0.294) (0.957)
female × – 0.341 – 0.089 – -3.206∗
plabor (0.526) (0.346) (1.642)
Adj. R2 0.082 0.082 0.098 0.098 0.142 0.146
N 6,124 6,124 15,643 15,643 1,339 1,339
Notes to Table 8
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering in parentheses. Controls are included for year dummies,
CPS-state dummies, ‘female × CPS-state’ interactions, and all the other co-
variates in column (5) of Table 3 except that the income co-variates are not
included in specifications that divide the sample by income groups. ∗ indicates
significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent. Any changes
in the constant term and in the coefficient for female arise from not excluding
CPS-state 16 from the CPS-state dummies and from the ‘female × CPS-state’
interactions.
41
Notes to Table 9
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering in parentheses. Controls are included for year dummies,
CPS-state dummies, ‘female × CPS-state’ interactions, and all the other co-
variates in column (5) of Table 3 except that the income co-variates are not
included. Adjusted R2 and number of observations for the regressions are: (1)
0.103 and 11,785; (2) 0.111 and 9,795; (3) 0.106 and 13,637; and (4) 0.098 and
16,284 respectively. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and
∗∗∗ at 1 percent. Any changes in the constant term and in the coefficient for
female arise from not excluding CPS-state 16 from the CPS-state dummies and
from the ‘female × CPS-state’ interactions.
Notes to Table 10
n.a. - not available. The union variable in 1982 is available for 471 men and








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variable 1965 1973 1982
female 50.0 50.0 50.0
age [year] Men 18.2 26.2 35.2
Women 18.0 26.0 35.0
Family formation
married Men 0.0 63.3 74.6
Women 0.0 73.0 71.3
divorced Men 0.0 2.4 5.9
Women 0.0 3.6 10.2
child Men 0.0 39.8 74.9
Women 0.0 51.9 79.2
Political preferences
democrat Men 29.6 30.0 25.6
Women 35.1 39.0 37.1
idemocrat Men 51.3 47.1 41.4
Women 61.2 53.7 53.0
Other
equal roles Men n.a. 31.9 44.2
Women n.a. 31.5 52.1
church Men 74.6 21.5 28.9
Women 87.1 32.7 43.6
union Men n.a. 20.8 28.0
Women n.a. 6.1 9.0
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Table 11:
Marital status and Democratic party identification
Dependent variable:
democrat idemocrat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
married -0.034 0.036 0.023 -0.031 0.029 0.077
(0.031) (0.039) (0.050) (0.029) (0.037) (0.050)
female × -0.005 -0.095∗ -0.082 -0.033 -0.107∗∗ -0.130∗
married (0.031) (0.050) (0.073) (0.029) (0.047) (0.074)
divorced -0.270∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.108 -0.071 -0.106
(0.077) (0.079) (0.087) (0.073) (0.075) (0.081)
female × 0.377∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.160∗ 0.228∗
divorced (0.093) (0.100) (0.110) (0.088) (0.095) (0.103)
child – -0.105∗∗∗ -0.080∗ – -0.090∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.044) (0.035) (0.044)
female × – 0.096∗ 0.068 – 0.083∗ 0.111∗
child (0.049) (0.058) (0.046) (0.059)
Notes to Table 11
OLS regression results reported, with standard errors in parentheses. The
regressions in columns (1),(2),(4) and (5) consist of observations of YPSS re-
spondents for the 1965, 1972, and 1983 waves, while regressions in columns (3)
and (6) are based on the 1973 and 1982 waves only. All regressions include
individual and year fixed effects. ∗ indicates significance at 10%, ∗∗ at 5%.
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Table 11: Marital status and Democratic party identification, (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
church – 0.018 -0.033 – -0.004 0.006
(0.029) (0.050) (0.028) ( 0.050)
female × – -0.051 0.097 – -0.035 -0.014
church (0.040) (0.067) (0.038) (0.068)
union – – 0.086∗ – – 0.127∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.049)
female × – – 0.010 – – -0.016
union (0.088) (0.089)
equal roles – – 0.020 – – -0.003
(0.039) (0.040)
female × – – -0.037 – – 0.009
equal roles (0.054) (0.054)
R2 within 0.010 0.014 0.007 0.020 0.024 0.006
N 3,385 3,385 2,090 3,385 3,385 2,090
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Table 12:
Did changes in political affiliation cause divorce?
Dependent variable: divorced73 82
Left defined as:
democrat idemocrat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
right65 left73 -0.014 – -0.019 –
(0.027) (0.023)
female × 0.034 – 0.039 –
right65 left73 (0.038) (0.030)
left65 right73 – -0.005 – 0.024
(0.023) (0.023)
female × – 0.037 – -0.037
left65 right73 (0.031) (0.032)
R2-within 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
Notes to Table 12
OLS regression results reported, with standard errors in parentheses. The
regressions in columns (1)-(3) consist of observations of YPSS respondents for
the 1965, 1972, and 1983 waves, while regressions in columns (4) and (5) are
based on the 1973 and 1982 waves only. All regressions include individual and
year fixed effects. ∗ indicates significance at 10%, ∗∗ at 5%.
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Table 13: Marital status transition matrix (YPSS)
1982
1973 Married Co-hab Widowed Divorced Separated Never Married Total
A. Women
Married 341 7 2 47 18 0 415
Co-hab 7 1 0 0 0 2 10
Widowed 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Divorced 8 5 0 5 3 0 21
Separated 6 2 0 3 2 0 13
Never Married 43 3 1 3 2 56 108
Total 405 19 3 58 25 58 568
B. Men
Married 315 12 0 19 11 2 359
Co-hab 6 2 0 1 1 1 11
Divorced 7 0 0 5 1 1 14
Separated 3 0 0 1 1 0 5
Never married 92 4 1 8 6 67 178
Total 423 18 1 34 20 71 567
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Table 14: Political preferences (YPSS)
1982
1973 Not-democrat (%) democrat (%) Total (%)
A. Divorced women
Not-democrat 24 (74) 9 (27) 33 (63)
democrat 0 (0) 19 (100) 19 (37)
Total 24 (46) 28 (54) 52 (100)
B. Divorced men
Not-democrat 10 (71) 4 (29) 14 (50)
democrat 7 (50) 7 (50) 14 (50)
Total 17 (61) 11 (39) 28 (100)
C. Not-divorced women
Not-democrat 178 (78) 50 (22) 228 (45)
democrat 61 (22) 222 (78) 283 (55)
Total 239 (47) 272 (53) 511 (100)
D. Not-divorced men
Not-democrat 235 (83) 49 (17) 284 (53)
democrat 78 (31) 174 (69) 252 (47)
Total 313 (58) 223 (42) 536 (100)
Notes to Table 14
Divorced defined to be those who were divorced in 1982 but not in 1973.
Not-divorced include all others.
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Notes to Table 15
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering in parentheses. The excluded categories are: female ×
year – 1964; education – ‘college educated’; cohort group – ‘pre-1911’ cohort;
income – ‘96-100’ percentile; CPS-state – 16 (give name of state). Coefficients
for ‘female × year’ interactions are only reported for the years of presidential
elections, however, all regressions include the full set of interaction. ∗ indicates
significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent.
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Table 15:
Individual determinants of Democratic party identification
Dependent variable: idemocrat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
female -0.005 -0.017 -0.024 -0.034 -0.050
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.417)
female × ‘1968’ 0.058 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.044
(0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
female × ‘1972’ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027)
female × ‘1976’ 0.039 0.046∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.055
(0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.046)
female × ‘1980’ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.109
(0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.073)
female × ‘1984’ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.083
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.087)
female × ‘1988’ 0.070∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.092
(0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.084)
female × ‘1992’ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.120
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.101)
female × ‘1996’ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.157
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.106)
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Table 15: Individual determinants of Democratic party identification (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
married – -0.051∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Black – 0.357∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
age – 0.006∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
age2 (×10−3) – -0.051∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
cohort:
1911-1942 – 0.039∗ 0.038∗ 0.038∗ 0.037∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
1942-1952 – 0.052∗ 0.049∗ 0.050∗ 0.049∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
1959- – 0.024 0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
religion:
Catholic – 0.077∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Protestant – -0.098∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Jewish – 0.238∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
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Table 15: Individual determinants of Democratic party identification (contin-
ued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
education:
< 9 years – – 0.067∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
9-12 years – – 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)




0-33 – – 0.140∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
34-95 – – 0.153∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
married × – – 0.051∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.052∗∗
‘0-33’ (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
married × – – 0.006 0.007 0.007
‘34-95’ (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
non-marriage:
pmarried – – – – 0.659
(0.463)




year yes yes yes yes yes
CPS-state yes yes yes yes yes
female × no no no yes yes
CPS-state
Adj. R2 0.020 0.091 0.097 0.098 0.098
N 26,215 25,848 24,140 24,140 24,140
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Table 16:
Non-marriage and Democratic party identification
Dependent Variable: idemocrat
Family income percentile
All incomes 0-33 34-95 96-100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
female -0.050 -0.051 0.373 0.251 -0.230 -0.027 1.111 1.559
(0.417) (0.439) (0.707) (0.684) (0.461) (0.498) (1.460) (1.297)
pmarried 0.659 0.469 0.762 0.589 0.564 0.439 0.515 0.866
(0.463) (0.504) (0.892) (0.856) (0.479) (0.573) (1.534) (1.486)
female × 0.020 0.033 -0.688 -0.399 0.383 0.096 -1.768 -2.533
pmarried (0.541) (0.578) (0.938) (0.903) (0.588) (0.657) (1.921) (1.740)
female × – -0.015 – 0.897∗∗∗ – -0.325∗ – -0.480
married (0.134) (0.280) (0.180) (0.706)
pmarried × – 0.293∗ – 0.845∗∗ – 0.156 – -0.418
married (0.150) (0.349) (0.223) (0.585)
female × – 0.012 – -1.361∗∗∗ – 0.454∗ – 0.862
pmarried× (0.201) (0.413) (0.275) (1.112)
married
Adj. R2 0.098 0.098 0.081 0.082 0.096 0.096 0.139 0.138
N 24,140 24,140 6,343 6,343 16,388 16,388 1,409 1,409
Notes to Table 16
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering are reported in parentheses. Controls are included for year
dummies, CPS-state dummies, ‘female × CPS-state’ interactions, and all the
other co-variates in column (5) of Table 3 except that the income co-variates
are not included in specifications that divide the sample by income groups. ∗
indicates significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent.
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Table 17:
Non-marriage and preference for redistribution
Dependent Variable: govspend
Family income percentile
All incomes 0-33 34-95 96-100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
female 0.176 -1.564 0.521 2.523
(0.643) (1.287) (0.779) (2.596)
pmarried 0.045 -1.757 0.395 0.860
(0.480) (2.014) (0.455) (3.587)
female × -0.143 2.517 -0.577 -3.123
pmarried (1.027) (2.167) (1.239) (4.168)
Adj. R2 0.088 0.039 0.083 0.101
N 9,969 2,505 6,880 584
Notes to Table 17
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering in parentheses. Controls are included for year dummies,
CPS-state dummies, ‘female × CPS-state’ interactions, and all the other co-
variates in column (5) of Table 3 except that the income co-variates are not
included in specifications that divide the sample by income groups. ∗ indicates
significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent.
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Table 18:




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
female 0.284 0.158 -0.259 -0.467 0.711 2.198
(0.889) (0.959) (0.537) (0.548) (1.555) (1.865)
pmarried 0.751 0.636 0.798 0.763 0.189 0.745
(1.019) (1.039) (0.507) (0.509) (1.656) (1.402)
female × -0.577 -0.545 0.313 0.377 -1.321 -1.892
pmarried (1.204) (1.206) (0.698) (0.690) (2.007) (1.849)
labor 0.000 0.001 -0.052 -0.052 -0.046 -0.054
(0.034) (0.034) (0.053) (0.052) (0.144) (0.141)
female × -0.001 -0.002 0.113∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.096 0.103
labor (0.034) (0.034) (0.054) (0.054) (0.160) (0.158)
plabor – -0.631 – -0.221 – 2.267∗∗∗
(0.698) (0.374) (0.869)
female × – 0.248 – 0.398 – -2.517
plabor (0.578) (0.374) (1.675)
Adj. R2 0.081 0.082 0.098 0.098 0.142 0.144
N 6,124 6,124 15,643 15,643 1,339 1,339
Notes to Table 18
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering in parentheses. Controls are included for year dummies,
CPS-state dummies, ‘female × CPS-state’ interactions, and all the other co-
variates in column (5) of Table 3 except that the income co-variates are not
included in specifications that divide the sample by income groups. ∗ indicates
significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent.
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Notes to Table 19
OLS regression results reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
CPS-state clustering in parentheses. Controls are included for year dummies,
CPS-state dummies, ‘female × CPS-state’ interactions, and all the other co-
variates in column (5) of Table 3 except that the income co-variates are not
included. Adjusted R2 and number of observations for the regressions are: (1)
0.103 and 11,785; (2) 0.110 and 9,795; (3) 0.106 and 13,637; and (4) 0.098 and
16,284 respectively. ∗ indicates significance at 10 percent, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data sources are abbreviated as: NES for ‘National Election Studies cumu-
lative file 1948-1998’; CPS for Annual Current Population Survey March Sup-
plement 1964-1996; YPSS for Youth Parent Socialization panel survey; youth
section 1965, 1973 and 1982 waves. In all data sets ‘no answer’, ‘do not know’,
and ‘not applicable’ are coded as missing values. The NES and CPS samples
are restricted to respondents aged 18-64 years.
NES and YPSS variables
Demographics:
female (NES and YPSS) Dummy equals 1 if respondent is female.
married (NES and YPSS) Dummy equals 1 if respondent married and living
with spouse; for YPSS dummy also equals 1 if spouse in military service.
divorced (YPSS) Dummy equals 1 if respondent divorced.
Black (NES) Dummy equals 1 if respondent is African American.
age (NES and YPSS) Respondent age in years.
cohort (NES) Four cohort dummies were created: Cohort born (i) prior to
1910; (ii) 1911-42; (iii) 1943-58; and (iv) after 1959.
Economic characteristics:
education (NES) Original question: 1964-1972 How many grades of school did
you finish? 1974-1996 What is highest grade of school or year of college
you have completed? Four education dummies were created (i) 0-8 grade
Grade school or less; (ii) 9-12 grade Completed grade school but no more
than high school; (iii) some college completed high school, some college
education but no college degree; (iv) college Completed college or higher
degree.
labor (NES) Dummy equals 1 if respondent in labor force at the time of the
survey.
income (NES) Three family income dummies were created: annual family in-
come in (i) 0-33 percentile (poor); (ii) 34-95 percentile (middle income);
and (iii) 96-100 percentile (rich).
union (YPSS) Dummy equals 1 if respondent is a union member.
Preferences:
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Democrat (NES and YPSS) Original question: ‘Generally speaking, do you
think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or what?’.
Prompted answers coded as 1=Strong Democrat; 2=Weak Democrat;
3=Independent-Democrat; 4=Independent-Independent; 5=Independent-
Republican; 6=Weak Republican; 7=Strong Republican. idemocrat dummy
equals 1 if respondent answered 1-3 from above classification; and demo-
crat dummy equals 1 if respondent answered 1-2 from above classifica-
tion. In the 1965 wave of the YPSS, the categories were slightly different:
11=Strong Democrat; 12=Not very strong Democrat; 13= yes, Democrat;
14=No, neither; 15=Yes, Republican; 16=Not very strong Republican;
17=Strong Republican. idemocrat dummy equals 1 if respondent an-
swered 11-13 from above classification; and democrat dummy equals 1 if
respondent answered 11-12 from above classification.
govspend (NES) Dummy equals 1 if respondent answered 4 through 7, on a
7 point scale, where 1 ‘Government should provide many fewer services:
reduce spending a lot’; and 7 ‘Government should provide many more
services: increase spending a lot’.
pro-choice (NES) Dummy equals 1 if respondent stated that abortion should
be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have difficulty
in caring for the child, or that abortion should never be forbidden, since
one should not require a woman to have a child she does not want.
equal roles (NES and YPSS) Original question: ‘Recently there has been a lot
of talk about women’s rights. Some people feel that women should have
an equal role with men in running business, industry and government.
Others feel that women’s place is in the home. And other people have
opinions somewhere in between. Where do you stand?’ Dummy equals 1
if respondent states men and women should have equal roles.
religion (NES) Based on respondent’s religious identity, three dummies: Catholic,
Protestant and Jewish.
church (NES) Dummy equals 1 if respondent attends church twice or more
times a month.
social (NES) Dummy equals 1 if respondent stated that most important prob-
lem government should try to take care of were social (includes: crime,
drugs, civil liberties and non-racial civil rights, women’s rights, abor-
tion rights, gun control, family/social/religious/moral ‘decay’, church and
state, etc.)
economics (NES) Dummy equals 1 if respondent stated that most important
problem government should try to take care of were economics, business
and consumer issues (includes foreign investment, tariffs/protection of
U.S. industries, international trade deficit/balance of payments, immi-
gration, interstate commerce/transportation)
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welfare (NES) Dummy equals 1 if respondent stated that most important prob-
lem government should try to take care of were social welfare (includes:
population, child care, aid to education, the elderly, health care, housing,
poverty, unemployment, ’welfare’ etc.)
CPS variables
CPS household weights used to create population shares. Sample restricted to
respondents aged 18-64. pdivorced created using information on CPS respon-
dent marital status, while plabor used information on all adult individuals in
household.
pdivorced Proportion of individuals in CPS-state aged 18-64 currently di-
vorced.
pmarried Proportion of individuals in CPS-state aged 18-64 currently married.
plabor Proportion women in CPS-state aged 18-64 currently in the labor force.
CPS-state The correspondence between CPS-state and individual U.S. states
is as follows: New England – Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Mas-
sachusetts and Rhode Island; East North Central – Michigan and Wis-
consin; West North Central – Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas; Middle Atlantic – Delaware, Vir-
ginia, Maryland and West Virginia; South 1 – North Carolina, South Car-
olina and Georgia; South 2 – Alabama and Mississippi South 3 – Arkansas,
Oklahoma and Louisiana; Border – Kentucky and Tennessee; Mountain
– Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico and
Arizona; Pacific – Washington, Alaska, Hawaii and Oregon. For all other
states the correspondence is one-to-one.
Unilateral divorce series
unilat Dummy equals 1 for all years from when a state introduces a no-fault
ground for divorce and has no separation requirement and follows classi-
fication by Gruber [2000].
Description of YPSS survey
In 1965 the students interviewed were chosen from a national probability sample
of 97 secondary schools selected with a probability proportionate to school size.
At each school, 15-21 randomly designated seniors were interviewed, for a total
of 1,669 respondents (drop-outs were eliminated from the sample). In 1973,
1,119 of these were re-interviewed and an additional 229 completed mailback
questionnaires. In 1982, 1,135 were re-interviewed (of which 177 completed the
mailback questionnaire). This reflected a retention rate of 68 percent between
1965 and 1982, and a rate of 84 percent between 1973 and 1982.
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Table A.1
Year of introduction of no-fault ground and
max 3 years separation requirement (unilat)
Governor Governor
Year of year of Year of year of
State unilat unilat State unilat unilat
Alabama 1971 D Nebraska 1972 D
Alaska 1935 D Nevada 1967 D
Arkansas s.c. – New Hampshire 1971 R
Arizona 1973 R New Jersey s.c. –
California 1970 R New Mexico 1933 D
Colorado 1972 R New York s.c. –
Connecticut 1973 R North Carolina s.c. –
Delaware 1968 D North Dakota 1971 D
Florida 1971 R/D Ohio s.c. –
Georgia 1973 R Oklahoma 1953 D
Hawaii 1972 D Oregon 1971 R
Idaho 1971 R/D Pennsylvania s.c. –
Illinois 1984 R Rhode Island 1975 D
Indiana s.c. – South Carolina s.c. –
Iowa 1970 R South Dakota 1985 R
Kansas 1969 D Tennessee s.c. –
Kentucky 1972 D Texas 1970 D
Louisiana s.c. – Utah 1987 R
Maine 1973 R Virginia s.c. –




Year of year of Year of year of
State unilat unilat State unilat unilat
Massachusetts 1975 D/R Washington 1973 R
Michigan 1972 R Washington, D.C. s.c. –
Minnesota 1974 D West Virginia s.c. –
Mississippi s.c. – Wisconsin 1972 D
Missouri s.c. – Wyoming 1977 D
Montana 1973 D
Source: Year of unilat from Gruber [2000].
R - Republican; D - Democrat; s.c. - still consent. If there was a shift of

























U.S. Political Gender Gap 
 
Note: The U.S. Political Gender Gap is defined as: proportion of women who are Democrat minus proportion men who 
are Democrat. 



























European Political Gender Gap 
 
Note: The European Political Gender Gap is the population weighted average Gender Gap for 10 European countries. 
For each country the European Political Gender Gap is defined as: proportion of women who favor the Left minus 
proportion of men who favor the Left. The countries include Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands (1970-1992). 
Denmark, Ireland, Luxemborg (1973-1992). United Kingdom (1970,1973-1992). Greece (1980-1992). 
































Reagan Democrats and Soccer Moms  
 
Note: This figure graphs the proportion of men and women who are Republicans, by education class. `Male College’ is 
the proportion of college educated men who are Republican; `Female College’ is the proportion of college educated 
women who are Republican; `Male High School’ is the proportion of high school educated men who are Republican; 
`Female High School’ the proportion of high school educated women who are Republican. 
































Time Trend in the Gender Gap 
 
Note: This figure graphs the coefficients for the set of `female  x year’ interaction terms which are reported in Table III. 
`No Controls’ refers to column (1), `Individual Controls’ to column (3) and `Individual Controls + pdivorced’ to 
column (5). 
